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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE: STATE OF MIND IN ISSUE* 
Under the general American rule utterances revealing present state 
of mind are admissible to prove the speaker's state of mind before, after, 
or at time of speaking. The orthodox reason for the rule is well stated 
by Wigmore:1 ". . . the judicial doctrine has been that there is a 
fair necessity, for lack of better evidence, for resorting to a person's 
own contemporary statements of his mental or physical condition. It 
is, indeed, possible to obtain by circumstantial evidence . . . some 
knowledge of a human being's internal state . . ., but in directness, 
amount, and value, this source of evidence must usually be decidedly 
inferior to the person's own contemporary assertions of those condi- 
tions." To the suggestion that the person's own statements on the stand 
would satisfy the need for his testimonial evidence, Wigmore says:2 
"The answer is that statements of this sort on the stand, where there 
is ample opportunity for deliberate misrepresentation and small means 
of checking it by other evidence or testing it by cross-examination, are 
comparatively inferior to statements made at times when no inducement 
to misrepresentation existed, and the probability of trustworthiness was 
greater." It will be observed that in this view hearsay testimony as to 
state of mind is not only better than circumstantial evidence, but also 
better than direct testimonial evidence. Here the great safeguards of 
cross-examination and the oath are regarded as inadequate. The state- 
ments of the speaker at the time when reported by one who can be 
sworn and cross-examined are more valuable than the testimony of 
the person whose internal state is the subject of discussion. 
This exception to the hearsay rule has been recognized longest for 
statements of present pain.3 These are not generally limited to state- 
ments to physicians,4 and even if made post litem motam may be ad- 
mitted in many states in the discretion of the judge.5 The important 
* For the background of these articles and references to others in the series, see 
Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: The Com- 
petency of Witnesses (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1017. The authors acknowledge their in- 
debtedness to the Commonwealth Fund, and to O. S. Cox, an honors student in 
Evidence at Yale. 
'3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) ? 1714. 
2Ibid. 
Ibid. ? 1718. 
'Ibid. ? 1719; see also State v. North, 217 N. W; 236 (Iowa, 1928); Smith v. 
Wilson, 296 S. W. 1036 (Mo. App. 1927). The New York rule restricting expres- 
sions of present pain to groans and screams must be regarded as an amusing eccen- 
tricity. 
3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1721; Schulz v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 4 
S. W. (2d) 762 (Mo. 1928). But see Koske v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co,. 142 Atl. 
43 (N. J. 1928). 
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limitation here is the exclusion of utterances of past pain.6 Descrip- 
tions of the circumstances of an injury, for instance, are inadmissible 
under this exception, since they are unnecessary, and "not naturally 
called forth by the present pain or suffering."7 Expressions of past 
pain, though as necessary as present, are excluded as untrustworthy, 
"for they are not naturally caused by the existing pain . . . , but, 
being deliberate accounts of past occurrences, are no better than state- 
ments of any other past events."8 Great reliance is placed on the power 
of present pain to call forth the truth. 
The hearsay exception is by no means confined to statements of 
suffering. It covers the whole range of intent in civil and criminal cases, 
playing a particularly prominent part in those where threats are in- 
volved.9 Wherever the state of a person's affections is important his 
words may be used to prove it.10 In domicile,1 in bankruptcy,12 in 
the law of gifts13 this type of evidence may be resorted to for the pur- 
pose of showing with what intention a person did an act which it is 
admitted he performed. Indeed, in almost any case, unless the court 
is misled by the supposed rule against self-serving statements (and if 
it is, it simply indicates that it does not understand this exception)14 
the extra-judicial utterances of an individual may be used to show his 
state of mind at that time, wherever his state of mind at another is 
material. 
The rule becomes particularly important in will cases on the issues 
of revocation and undue influence. To show the revoking mind state- 
ments at the time or not too remote are admissible.15 In dealing with 
undue influence, the courts generally manage to admit the utterances of 
the testator, if they seem to have any value, either by creating a special 
exception for them, or by saying that they indicate the susceptibility of 
the testator to pressure and deceit, or by saying that it is always per- 
' See (1920) 5 CORN. L. Q. 333; (1920) 34 HARV. L. REV. 88; (1914) 2 CALIF. 
L. REV. 243; Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Institution v. Industrial Comm. 262 Pac. 
99 (Utah, 1927). 
73 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1722. 
8 Ibid. 
9Ibid. ? 1732; (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 675; Williams v. Great Southern Lum- 
ber Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 417 (U. S. 1928). 
03 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1730; (1902) 15 HARV. L. REV. 582; 
(1915) 15 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 190; (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV. 315; (1920) 68 
U. OF PA. L. REV. 187. 
3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1727; (1916) 16 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 425. 
12 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1728; Rawson v. Haigh, 2 Bing. 99 (1824). 
In re Brown's Estate, 130 Misc. 865, 226 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1927). 
4 Davis v. State, 111 So. 645 (Ala. 1927); but cf. Hawes v. State, 112 So. 759, 
761 (Ala. App. 1926, 1927); State v. Liston, 2 S. W. (2d) 780 (Mo. 1928). But 
see Stapleton v. State, 298 S. W. 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927). 
13 WIGMORE, op cit. supra note 1, ? 1737; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164, 
102 N. E. 487 (1913). 
148 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.99 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 18:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 149 
missible to show the deceased's attitude toward specific persons.16 So 
general is the rule admitting these statements and so refined are the 
distinctions used to justify it that Mr. Wigmore concludes,17 "It would 
seem more sensible to listen to all the utterances of a testator, without 
discrimination as to admissibility, and then leave them to the jury with 
careful instructions as to how to use them." 
We are dealing here, then, with a very broad rule; one which can 
be resorted to in almost any kind of case. The magic phrase, "state of 
mind," serves to secure the introduction of testimony that otherwise 
would be excluded as hearsay of the rankest sort. The availability or 
unavailability of the declarant is unimportant. This evidence is better 
than anything he might say on the stand. As we have suggested else- 
where,l8 where these catchwords make admissible the statements of an 
available declarant to prove his commission of some act, the supposed 
necessity upon which their importance is grounded has disappeared. 
The speaker's testimony to the commission of the act is better than his 
hearsay remarks. The importance of those hearsay remarks depends on 
the use to which they are put. Using them to prove an act is one thing; 
using them to prove state of mind, when that is in issue, quite another. 
We must now take one further step and assert that even where state of 
mind is in issue, the use to which statements reflecting it are put should 
determine their admissibilty. It may be that we shall find that the em- 
ployment of a concept so general as state of mind to cover a vast multi- 
tude of different situations is misleading. Certainly it is somewhat 
confusing. 
Before describing this wilderness more minutely or attempting to 
suggest roads out of it, we should perhaps intimate that we do not regard 
the battle between objective and mentalist psychologists about such con- 
cepts as state of mind as important or even germane to this discussion.19 
This terminological dispute is as profitable as one on the relative merits 
of "bread" and "brot" as a description of a familiar household com- 
modity. The legal "state of mind" is an inference from observable 
data. If it is treated as such it is harmless, and frequently useful. The 
only danger arises when a concept is endowed with powers of its own, 
16 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1738; Linebarger v. Linebarger, 143 N. C. 
229, 55 S. E. 709 (1906); In re Cable's Will, 213 App. Div. 512, 210 N. Y. Supp. 
187 (3d Dept. 1925); In re Allen's Estate, 230 Mich. 584, 203 N. W. 479 (1925); 
Ezell v. Mobley, 160 Ga. 872, 129 S. E. 532. 
1T 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, ? 1738. s Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: State 
of Mind to Prove an Act (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 283. 19 The arguments in favor of mentalism, for instance, because of similarity of 
concepts used by mentalism and the law. See ROBACK, BEHAVIORISM AND PSY- 
CHOLOGY (1923) c. X, and GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW. 
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which are not to be found in the facts on which it rests. As long as the 
logical problem is noted and logical errors are avoided; as long as there 
are observable data, there is little reason for restraining the mentalist 
or behaviorist from using the terms most useful to him. Here the 
phrase "state of mind" is used in its conventional legal sense; but we 
shall attempt at the same time to inquire into the situations it is pro- 
miscuously used to describe, and thus to determine its importance in 
terms of human behavior. 
When state of mind is used to prove an act, the psychological prob- 
lem may be simply stated. If two items of behavior are frequently 
found together, and seldom if ever apart,20 we can infer the probable 
existence of the one from the observed existence of the other. We may 
assume different middle terms, that is, we may say that A and B are 
found together because of a connecting state of mind, or an interven- 
ing X. Regardless of the physical existence of the assumed connection, 
the fact remains that A and B are frequently found together. And 
that, when state of mind is used to prove an act, is all the court wishes 
to know. 
Where state of mind is in issue, the problem is a different one. 
In the early stages of the development of the law, the courts used the 
phrase "state of mind" to describe the moral responsibility of the indi- 
vidual. Perhaps the phrase may now be usefully employed, not to shed 
light on the depravity of a man, but to permit the introduction of data 
which will assist the court in predicting human behavior.21 It will now 
be generally agreed that the function of a court is the control of human 
conduct. To control it, the court wishes to predict future behavior, 
which must of course be done from a knowledge of past behavior. 
Therefore the tribunal will desire to have in hand those data which will 
enable it to predict a future course of conduct. Some of these data 
may be called state of mind, which, in turn, may be evidenced by words 
or other acts. 
These words or acts are important because they may indicate char- 
acteristic conduct, that is, the habitual behavior of an individual.22 We 
are aware that many courts do not give habit in the law of evidence 
much weight, on the ground that what a man did at one time is no 
20 RUSSELL, PHILOSOPHY (1923) p. 83. 
The amount and type of data needed is indicated in WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY 
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORIST (1924) 6 et seq., and the various case 
histories in such works as FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS (1924), or ABRAHAM, SE- 
LECTED PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1927). These volumes are selected because 
they are right at hand; of course all psychological and psychiatric literature is 
concerned with that problem. 
22 For elaboration of this point see forthcoming article on Habit and Character 
in the Law of Evidence by Adler and Michael. 
150 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.99 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 18:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 151 
indication of what he did at another.23 Chickens and dogs24 are influ- 
enced by their histories; but men have free will and can shake them- 
selves loose from the past. This attitude finds little support in psy- 
chology. The tendency in psychology has been to attach greater and 
greater importance to habit.25 Even at the time of William James 
habit was of the utmost significance.26 Since his time it has become the 
focus of most psychological study. In psychiatry the bulk of a case 
history is an investigation of the individual's habits.27 John Dewey 
points out that in studying normal people habit is as vital as it is in 
psychiatry. He says:28 "Habits may be profitably compared to phy- 
siological functions like breathing, digesting." Habit means a "special 
sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli . . . rather 
than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will." Again "the dy- 
namic force of habit taken in connection with the continuity of habits 
with one another explains the unity of character and conduct." 
By way of contrast, and to indicate the prevailing legal attitude, 
we may consider the case of murder, in which the tribunal must inquire 
whether the killing was premeditated. Premeditation connotes control 
by the free will of the actor. This judicial faith iri free will runs directly 
counter to the growing psychological faith in habit. If as James said 
years ago,29 a man at thirty is nothing but a walking bundle of habits, 
it is clear that when we speak of an act as controlled, we merely mean 
that for the moment one set of habits is stronger than another.30 Thus 
a habit of going to work at nine o'clock in the morning may conflict 
with one of staying in bed after having worked late the night before. 
Whether the individual gets up or stays in bed will be determined by 
which habit pattern is called into action by the total situation. These 
habit patterns and the stimuli which bring them into activity now con- 
stitute the chief material of the science of psychology. Indeed, any 
science would be unthinkable if free will played an important part in 
it. In the case of premeditation in murder, therefore, its existence indi- 
cates an interval between the initial stimulus and the response, the kill- 
ing, in which a conflict of habits has taken place. The result is that we 
23Zucker v. Waitridge, 205 N. Y. 50, 98 N. E. 209 (1912); Noyes v. Boston 
& M. R. R., 213 Mass. 9, 99 N. E. 457. 
Broderick v. Higginson, 169 Mass. 482, 48 N. E. 269 (1897). 
25 PERRIN AND KLEIN, PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 124-130. Also the numerous refer- 
ences to habit in any modern textbook in psychology. 
28 JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890) c. IV; X. BRIEFER COURSE, C. X. 
27 See case histories in volumes cited, supra note 21. Also WHITE, LECTURES ON 
PSYCHIATRY (1928) 7-10. 
8 DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922) 14, 42, 43. 
29 JAMES, op. cit. supra note 26, 121, 127. 
3 OGDEN, MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 258; DEWEY, op. cit. supra note 28, 
76 et seq. 
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may assume the ascendant pattern to be the usual or characteristic re- 
ponse to this type of stimulus. The killing might, on the other hand, 
have arisen suddenly, the result of an emotional stimulus that released 
a very unusual pattern response. The law is interested in these facts 
because it wishes to know not only what has happened, but what is 
likely to happen in the future when similar stimuli are brought to bear 
on the same or similar individuals. 
In other fields of law the same interest in future behavior appears. 
When the question is what is the "state of mind" of the alleged donor 
of property, his words may be offered to reveal it. These words would 
indicate the probability of his attempting to reclaim the property at some 
future time, or to demand payment for it. Where the issue is domicile 
the courts wishes to know the likelihood that the declarant will reside 
in New Haven in the future rather than in New York. Even when 
pain is proved by extra-judicial utterances of the sufferer, we are fre- 
quently concerned, as in Insurance Co. v. Mosley,31 not with pain as 
an end in itself, but as evidence of the extent and character of the in- 
jury. This in turn resolves itself into the probable effect of the bodily 
harm upon the future behavior of the injured person. 
The law, then, is interested in the dynamics of behavior. It de- 
mands enough context, enough accompanying detail, so that it can 
assume a future course of conduct, which it will control according to 
its own philosophy. The courts now seem to feel that they have enough 
data if along with the specific act they learn what the actor said or did 
in relation to the act. It is usually necessary to resort to what he said; 
and what he said is what is admitted as showing his "state of mind." 
Since whatever their limitations we cannot avoid the use of words, 
it might seem that the simplest way to learn about the state of mind of 
an individual is to ask him on the stand to tell what his state of mind 
was at a given time. Surely no one knows it better than the person who 
had it. In fact in all jurisdictions except Alabama it is permissible to 
learn about state of mind in just this way.32 When this method is fol- 
lowed what we get in civil cases is the witness's opinion of what his 
future course of conduct would have been. This opinion is based on 
data available only to him, and is consequently inferior to a more ob- 
jective way of discovering it. In criminal cases, the net result of the 
witness's testimony is that he gives the jury his version of his char- 
acter, his appraisal of his habits; in effect, his notion of whether or not 
he is the kind of man who would commit a crime. This again is based 
' 8 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1869). 32 State v. Holland, 193 N. C. 713, 138 S. E. 8 (1927); Prince v. State, 215 Ala. 276, 110 So. 407 (1926); State v. Phillips, 279 S. W. 749 (Mo. 1926); cf. Hall v. State, 216 Ala. 336, 113 So. 64 (1927). 
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on data available only to him. These data are for the most part what 
Mr. Watson calls implicit responses,33 for the study of which few ob- 
jective methods have yet been devised. Besides these difficulties there is 
the added problem of the unreliability of report where the implicit re- 
ponse is an emotional one.34 Of course the jury probably take some of 
these points into consideration. If they do so, however, their criteria are 
those of common sense and general experience, which are not always 
infallible. 
The other principal method of proving state of mind is one which 
may be resorted to even when the person whose internal state is in issue 
has taken or can take the stand. That is the method made possible by 
the exception to the hearsay rule for extra-judicial utterances supposedly 
revealing state of mind. On the face of it, this would seem to be free 
from the difficulties that we have noted in connection with the person's 
own report of his previous state of mind. It looks objective; the wit- 
ness is under oath and subject to cross-examination; the witness can 
observe and report other overt conduct of the speaker tending to qualify, 
support, or explain the words to which he testifies; there is the possi- 
bility that other witnesses may be able to check the story that this wit- 
ness tells. The statement of the person at the time is likely to be a 
more accurate picture of his state of mind than his memory of it later 
on. This is the basis of the strong position taken by Wigmore35 in 
favor of admitting extra-judicial utterances in this connection. What 
is overlooked by the courts and learned commentators is that the memory 
of some witness is always involved, whether the statement is hearsay 
or direct testimony to state of mind. The witness to extra-judicial 
utterances remembers words. The witness testifying to his own previ- 
ous state of mind remembers what Wigmore calls his internal state at 
an earlier time. But it is well known that the memory of words is a most 
unreliable type of recollection.36 This does not mean that the hearsay 
exception should be abolished or that the courts and commentators are 
wrong in thinking that a contemporary assertion more accurately re- 
flects actual conditions than the person's own later memory. It does 
mean that we have to deal with some person's later memory in any 
case, and that the memory involved in the hearsay exception, the memory 
of words, is so weak as to qualify somewhat our enthusiasm for extra- 
judicial as against testimonial reports of state of mind. 
33 WATSON, op. cit. supra note 21, 218, 343, 346. 
4 Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spon- 
taneous Exclamations (1928) 28 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 432. 
35 Loc. cit. supra note 1. 
36 Compare, for instance, the figures in WOODWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY (1921) 351 
and 352. 
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We have now discussed the two general methods of proving what 
is called state of mind, and shall consider the hearsay exception in 
greater detail. In dealing with what is called state of mind to prove 
state of mind, we are not concerned with words to prove other overt 
acts. We are concerned with words to prove circumstantially implicit 
responses or what the courts call state of mind. When the words 
establish overt conduct, there are other ways of doing the same thing, 
so that the unavailability of the speaker may well be required as a condi- 
tion precedent to the admission of his extra-judicial utterances. When 
implicit responses are in issue, they can be proved satisfactorily only 
by the words of the person experiencing them. His death or absence 
from the jurisdiction will therefore not generally be a prerequisite to 
the admission of his reported language. 
Another difference in the two types of case is that when state of 
mind is used to prove an overt act the tense of the statement is compara- 
tively unimportant.37 When the utterances are regarded as establishing 
implicit responses, the time to which they refer may have considerable 
significance. In the latter case, when the words precede the overt act 
they are supposed to qualify; they indicate, to use Woodworth's ter- 
minology,38 a mechanism ready to behave in a certain way. We have 
the same situation when the words accompany the act in question. "I'll 
get you,"39 or "The next time she passes here, I am going to kill her,"40 
indicate that upon an appropriate stimulus this mechanism will behave 
in this way. The past relations were a stimulus which put the mechan- 
ism in readiness. The appearance of the other party put the mechanism 
in drive. The period of readiness has given opportunity for the con- 
flict of behavior patterns to take place.4' The association of the words 
and the other overt acts suggests that those acts have a history which 
makes repetition of them likely.42 The general attitude of the courts 
is that statements of presently existing state of mind, though admissible 
when remote from the main act, are progressively weaker as they get 
farther away from it in time.43 This conclusion is quite justified when 
the words are employed to prove the commission of the main act. When 
their importance is in the light they throw on the established behavior 
patterns of the individual, remoteness, within limits, may be an advan- 
tage. Expressions of a desire to kill a man whom it is admitted the 
37 Hutchins and Slesinger, op. cit. supra note 18. 
"WOODWORTH, DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY (1918) 36. 
3State v. Ballard, 191 N. C. 122, 131 S. E. 370 (1926). 
40 State v. King, 159 La. 972, 106 So. 461 (1925). 
41DEWEY, op. cit. supra note 28. 
42 Simply because we have more (though not all) of the data necessary. 
43 (1920) 20 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 800; and see threat cases referred to infra. 
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defendant killed, made thirteen months,44 or two years before the shoot- 
ing45 reflect the history of relations between him and the deceased more 
impressively than words uttered a few moments before the gun went off. 
When the words follow the admitted act they may not reflect the 
relations between the parties, because of the strong possibility that 
they were a response to the admitted act itself. Where the evening 
after the difficulty, the defendant remarked that he hoped the son of a 
bitch would die,46 the elegant language employed may indicate a past 
history, but may, on the other hand, merely indicate an animus felt as a 
result of the difficulty. Where there is other evidence of the' relations of 
the parties these words may be profitably used for corroboration; but 
where they alone are used to prove state of mind they have elements of 
weakness. 
What has been said applies with particular force to threats. Threats 
when used to prove the commission of a crime have slight probative 
value.47 There they may simply show personality type, rather than 
implicit readiness for certain future behavior. When the act is con- 
ceded, however, previous threats are not open to this objection. Here 
the question is not whether something was done, but whether something 
that was done is likely to be done again. A previous threat, therefore, sig- 
nifies that the act had a past, on the basis of which we may predict the 
future behavior of the individual. Threats made after the act are sub- 
ject to the general criticism that has been suggested of any words that 
follow the situation they qualify. 
Another important use of words in this exception to the hearsay 
rule is to prove the presence or absence of undue influence in will cases. 
Here, as Wigmore suggests,48 the words actually go to show undue in- 
fluence whatever may be the theoretical basis of their admission. The 
question is, did the will carry out the testator's wishes or those of some- 
one else, against the wishes of the testator? To answer it the mere words 
of the testator at any time will not suffice. In order to infer the probable 
disposition of his property after his death one must know a good deal 
about his attitudes during his lifetime. This will be shown in part by 
words at various times, but much more clearly by other overt incidents 
in the testator's past. Although statements to relatives, for example, 
may very well be misleading, the fact that in twenty years the testator 
44 State v. Hanson, 53 N. D. 879, 207 N. W. 1000 (1926). 
45 State v. Ross, 160 La. 661, 107 So. 481 (1926); People v. Singh, 260 Pac. 327 
(Cal. App. 1927). The point of view here favored is suggested in People v. Frank, 
327 Ill. 393, 158 N. E. 712 (1927). 
46Watson v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. App. 152, 287 S. W. 265 (1926). 
47 Hutchins and Slesinger, loc. cit. supra note 18. 
48 
Op. cit. supra note 16. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.99 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 18:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
visited his nephew living on the next block but once need arouse no 
special scepticism on the part of the jury. 
If history is important in showing the probable wishes of the testa- 
tor, it is no less so where undue influence is suspected as a cause of the 
will's not being in accord with expectations based upon behavior. The 
real problem here is the suggestibility of the deceased with regard to the 
suspected stimulus. His words again are of some use in this connection. 
But they alone will not show whether he was more or less suggestible. 
In order to show this counsel will wish to present an account of his 
past behavior under various circumstances. If in other circumstances 
he appeared to be suggestible, there is ground for inference that he 
may have been so in drawing his will. This is substantially the attitude 
of the courts toward this kind of testimony. In order to come some- 
what closer to scientific accuracy in presenting and appraising this type 
of evidence courts and counsel might familiarize themselves with the 
clinical and laboratory material on the subject. This would perhaps 
provide more definite notions of the particular facts which should be 
sought for and proved.49 
The purpose of admitting utterances of present pain is frequently 
to reveal the extent of the injury, and its effect, therefore, on the future 
behavior of the sufferer. The external manifestation of pain is an 
avoidance reaction sometimes accompanied by vocal expression.50 In 
fact it is more than possible that these avoidance reactions and the 
concomitant sounds actually are what we commonly call pain. Mars- 
ton reports51 that during the last few years he was able on three occa- 
sions to prevent the avoidance reaction to stimuli that would ordinarily 
have caused pain. On those occasions he was conscious of no pain what- 
ever. On the other hand, this type of reaction may arise as a conditioned 
response. Most people have had the experience of cringing in the 
dentist's chair, although what the dentist did at the moment turned out 
not to be painful. Thus it would seem that there are some limitations 
on the effective use of pain as disclosing the extent of an injury. A 
further limitation may arise in dealing with that comparatively small 
group who because of a neurosis complain of pain for which no physical 
'4 The type of data required will depend upon the results of such studies as those 
of Brown, Individual and Sex Differences in Suggestibility (1916) 2 U. OF 
CALIF. PUBLICATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY NO. 6; Otis, A Study of Suggestibility of 
Children (1924) ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY NO. 70; and MORGAN, THE PSY- 
CHOLOGY OF ABNORMAL PEOPLE (1928) 431 et seq. 
0 CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE (1915) 185 
et seq. 
51 MARSTON, EMOTIONS OF NORMAL PEOPLE (1928) 178-182; and Marston, Mo- 
tor Consciousness as a Basis for Emotion, (1927) 22 JOURNAL ABNORMAL AND 
SOCIAL PSYCH. 140. 
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cause can be found.52 Here the uncorroborated reports of bodily con- 
dition are not of much value. In the absence of a simple and effective 
technique for giving psychiatric examinations as part of the apparatus 
of legal procedure, all that court and counsel can do to detect these 
neurotics is to become aware of that material collected by psychiatrists 
and psychologists which will disclose their external characteristics. 
It therefore appears that the concept "state of mind" has produced 
the admissibility of evidence in widely diverse fields. When we examine 
the actual situation it would seem that the human data in those various 
fields are so diverse as to make the utility of the concept doubtful. 
Professor Chafee53 has made the interesting suggestion that statements 
of presently existing state of mind are admissible whether they refer to 
the future or the past because "the stream of consciousness has enough 
continuity so that we may expect to find the same characteristics for 
some distance up or down the current." Our analysis would lead us 
rather to believe that this peaceful stream is full of eddies and rapids. 
When a threat is used to prove an act it is poor evidence; when used to 
show a tendency it is good. A statement in the past tense may be useful 
in proving the occurrence of an act, although less useful when the im- 
plicit responses accompanying the act are in issue. In some cases, 
words are valuable, although unsupported; in others, to have much im- 
portance, they should be corroborated. The law, then, may well come 
to the same conclusion to which psychology came when it gave up the 
concept of the faculties and substituted for it studies of specific be- 
havior.54 The general concept "state of mind" may prove to be too 
broad to be useful. From the practical point of view it will be more 
effective to replace state of mind with mental states. Then the admissi- 
bility of the evidence in any case will depend on the use to which it is 
put. 
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DONALD SLESINGER. 
52 FREUD, INHIBrrION, SYMPTOM AND ANXIETY (1927); ROSANOFF, MANUAL 
OF PSYCHIATRY (6th ed. 1922) 55, 147. 
3 The Progress of the Law (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 302, 443, 444. 
"WOODWORTH, op. cit. supra note 38, 60, 61. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.99 on Fri, 18 Apr 2014 18:06:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
